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ABSTRACT MON. CA 93943-J 01
The purpose of this thesis is to study the usability an upgraded Maintenance Error
Information Management System (MEIMS) tool used to capture human error in Naval
Aviation maintenance mishaps. Built upon the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System-Maintenance Extension taxonomy, the tool provides the
framework for examining maintenance errors that lead to mishaps, incidents, and
personal injuries. The tool is developed for safety personnel, mishap investigators,
Aircraft Mishap Board members, and analysts. In limited usability testing, the tool was
found to be useful, but in need of revisions, specifically regarding functionality and user
friendliness. Additionally, a tutorial is provided to better prepare targeted users of the
tool. The study requires a review of mishap information systems, human error theories
related to aviation mishaps, design considerations for human-computer interfaces and
usability study applications. A follow-on usability study, conducted using two groups of
potential users, one which received the tutorial and one which did not. It includes a
survey regarding subjective responses about the prototype tool. The results indicate that
the tutorial is effective in preparing and assisting potential users, and that the tool could
make a significant impact in the reduction of mishap rates due to maintenance error.
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In the last half century, Naval Aviation has reduced the Class A Flight Mishaps
(FM) rate significantly. In fact, the Class A FM rate was reduced by 50 percent in each
decade from 1950 to 2000 (see Figure 1). Despite this success, the cost of mishaps, in
terms of lives and assets, remains too high. Furthermore, human error, attributable to
four out of every five mishaps, has remained constant (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997). In
response to a 1996 F-14 Tomcat FM, which was largely attributable to human error, a
Human Factors Quality Management Board (HFQMB) was initiated to study human error
in Naval Aviation mishaps. The HFQMB 's charter ( 1 997) was to reduce the mishap rate
by identifying systematic improvements in processes and systems that affect human
performance and to institutionalize continual improvements in these areas. The HFQMB
is made up of Flag Officers, senior operational officers, and a cross section of
Commanding Officers to seasoned naval aviators from all communities. Their objective
was to reduce the Class A FM rate by half within three years, and by 75 percent within 10
years (HFQMB, 1997).
The HFQMB 's strategy entailed a three-pronged approach: (1) Mishap Data
Analysis (MDA), (2) Organizational Benchmarking (OB), and (3) Command Safety
Assessment (CSA). MDA studies historical records to determine established trends of
human error in aviation mishaps. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) was developed to accomplish this task. By examining and classifying
past mishaps, prevailing human errors are prioritized and targeted for prevention. The
second phase, OB, involved the observance of other organizations, both military and
civilian, for procedures and practices that might be useful in helping reduce the
occurrence of human error. To this end, Naval Aviation adopted Organizational Risk
Management, which associates conditions with risk and decision making methodology to
reduce the occurrence of aviation mishaps, directly from the U. S. Army (Department of
the Navy, 1997). CSA was developed at the Naval Postgraduate School by Civarelli and
Figlock (1997) as a tool to measure the safety climate in a squadron from an aircrew
perspective. It solicits opinions and attitudes towards procedures and practices to
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Figure 1: FY 1950-1999 Naval Aviation Class A Flight Mishap Rates
(From School of Aviation Safety, 1999)
In January 1999, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations extended the short-term goal
of 50 percent reduction in Class A FM mishap rate from the end of FY 1999 to the end of
FY2000. To meet this goal, the scope of the HFQMB needed to expand to include
human error in maintenance mishaps. Historically, approximately one in every five Class
A FMs contains maintenance error. By expanding the focus to include maintenance
error, it was believed that the 50 percent reduction objective could be met. An identical
three-prong approach that had been used for aircrew error was utilized for maintenance
error.
2. Maintenance Mishap Data Analysis
HFACS was developed as a framework for examining aircrew and supervisory
error in Class A FMs. It concurs with the Naval Aviation Safety Program's
(OPNVAVTNST 3750.6) notion of multiple causal factors, chain of events, and human
factors. A maintenance extension (ME) was added to HFACS to meet the HFQMB's
expanded scope and was used to examine incidents and injuries (Schmidt, Figlock &
Teeters, 1999), and major to minor mishap data (Schmidt, Schmorrow & Figlock, 2000).
HFACS-ME was adopted for the upcoming revision of the Naval Aviation Safety
Program. Furthermore, a laptop prototype tool, Maintenance Extension Information
Management System (MEIMS) was developed to allow users to collect, catalog, collate
and analyze mishap data, to better identify trends and for safety training. MEIMS, in
limited usability testing, was determined to be a valuable tool that will provide the fleet
great benefit (Wood, 2000).
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To meet the objective of a 50 percent reduction in Class A FMs, both aircrew and
maintenance error needed to be targeted. The HFACS-ME taxonomy and MEIMS were
developed to better analyze maintenance error. While proven useful in a limited usability
study, MEEMS is not without limitations. Users found the tool to be somewhat difficult
to navigate, was lacking in assistance functionality and its interface needed to be more
user-friendly. Additionally, it was determined that its intended users (e.g., squadron
maintenance and safety personnel, squadron safety officers, Aircraft Mishap Board
members, Naval Safety Center analysts, etc) would benefit from a training tutorial prior
to accessing the tool (Wood, 2000). This study will further develop MEEVIS based upon
the initial usability study. It is believed that the fleet user, with proper training, should be
able to easily access the tool and obtain useful information, which can then be used in
training, hazard identification and trend analysis, to prevent future mishaps.
This thesis investigates the following questions:
1
.
What query capabilities are required by the users of the information
system to best identify problem areas and trends?
2. What additions will make the information system more user-friendly,
allowing efficient and effective access to the system's capabilities?
3. What kind of training, in the form of a tutorial, would best prepare users to
efficiently and effectively access the information system's full
capabilities?
C. PURPOSE
The intent of this study is to refine and evaluate the existing safety information
management system, which uses the HFACS-ME taxonomy as its basis, to better
facilitate data collection, organization, query, analysis and reporting of maintenance
personnel errors that contribute to Naval Aviation mishaps, equipment damage and
personnel injury. Included are theoretical approaches that examine mishaps involving
human error: Heinrich's "Domino" Theory, Edwards' "SHEL" Model, and Reason's
"Swiss Cheese" Model. These models not only help identify the unsafe actions which
cause mishaps, but they also connect the conditions underlying the mishap. HFACS-ME
is a composite derivative of these taxonomies. Although there is no universally accepted
method of accident investigation (Benner, 1975), some standardized aircraft accident
investigation procedures have been adopted by most agencies throughout the world
(Diehl, 1991). Using HFACS-ME as its basis, MEJMS will significantly improve access
and analysis of mishap data.
The results of this study will (1) improve and enhance the MEEMS prototype
tool's usability so that data can be easily queried and analyzed, (2) creation of a tutorial
for fleet customers that will enhance their ability to not only access the data base, but to
efficiently and effectively use this information to prevent future mishaps, and (3) study
the performance of two groups of participants, with only one group receiving the tutorial,
to determine the effectiveness of the tutorial for fleet users.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
MEMS will be revised to include a users' tutorial. Fleet personnel, primarily
Aviation Safety Officers, will test MEIMS to determine its usability and the benefits of
the help and tutorial functionality. The fully developed MEIMS tool will be used
primarily by Naval Aviation squadrons, but may have some crossover use by other
military branches and civilian airlines. Only maintenance related mishaps caused by
human error are considered. No material failure factors or maintenance related hazard
reports or personnel injuries not related to a mishap are included.
E. DEFINITIONS
This study uses the following definitions:
Aircraft Mishap Board : Group of officers appointed to investigate and report on
an aviation mishap.
Aviation mishap rate : Number of aviation mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.
Aviation Safety Officer : Principal advisor to Naval Aviation squadron
commanding officers on all aviation safety matters.
F-14 Tomcat : U. S. Navy's swing-wing, supersonic fighter aircraft with air-to-air,
air-to-ground, and reconnaissance capability.
Fleet Logistics Support Wing : U. S. Navy reserve air wing comprised of transport
aircraft.
HFACS : Human Factors Analysis and Classification System designed to help
analyze Naval Aviation mishaps focusing on aircrew error.
HFACS-ME : Human Factors Analysis and Classification System—Maintenance
Extension adaptation to classify causal factors that contribute to maintenance mishaps.
HFQMB : Human Factors Quality Management Board established by Naval
Aviation senior leadership to reduce human error involvement in Naval Aviation Class A
flight mishaps.
MEIMS : Maintenance Error Information Management System, a prototype tool
developed to collect, catalog, collate and analyze mishap data.
Mishap : A naval mishap is an unplanned event or series of events directly
involving naval aircraft, which result in $10,000 or greater cumulative damage to naval
aircraft, other aircraft, property, or personnel injury.
Mishap Categories: Naval aircraft mishap categories are defined below:
Flight Mishap (FM) : Those mishaps in which there was $10,000 or
greater DOD aircraft damage or loss of a DOD aircraft, and intent for flight for
DOD aircraft existed at the time of the mishap. Other property damage, injury, or
death may or may not have occurred.
Flight Related Mishap (FRM) : Those mishaps in which there was less
than $10,000 DOD aircraft damage, and intent for flight (for DOD aircraft)
existed at the time of the mishap, and $10,000 or more total damage or a defined
injury or death occurred.
Aircraft Ground Mishap (AGM) : Those mishaps in which no intent for
flight existed at the time of the mishap and DOD aircraft loss, or $10,000 or more
aircraft damage, and/or property damage, or a defined injury or death occurred.
Mishap Severity Class : Mishap severity based on injury and property damage.
Class A : A mishap in which the total cost of property damage
(including all aircraft damage) is $1,000,000 or greater; or a naval aircraft is
destroyed or missing; or any fatality or permanent total disability occurs with
direct involvement of naval aircraft.
Class B : A mishap in which the total cost of property damage
(including all aircraft damage) is $200,000 or more, but less than $1,000,000
and/or a permanent partial disability, and/or the hospitalization of five or more
personnel.
Class C : A mishap in which the total cost of property damage
(including all aircraft damage) is $10,000 or more but less then $200,000 and/or
injury results in five or more lost workdays.
Naval Aircraft : Refers to U.S. Navy, Naval Reserve, and Marine Corps aircraft.
OPNAVINST 3750.6: The Naval Aviation Safety Program : U.S. Navy instruction
outlining Naval Aviation's safety program.
ORM: Operational Risk Management. A decision making tool to increase
effectiveness by anticipating and reducing hazards, thus increasing the probability of a
successful mission.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II contains a literature review on the development of a prototype to
identify human error involvement and patterns in aviation maintenance mishaps. The
methods used in this study are discussed in Chapter III. The results of this study are




The literature studied encompasses human error, maintenance error in aviation,
error classification and analysis. It includes textbooks, research articles, and masters
thesis pertaining to: (1) human error theories, and their relation to maintenance related
aviation mishaps, (2) accident information management, and (3) design and usability
assessment of software tools. This information provides the basis for the continuing
development of the maintenance error analysis and reporting prototype tool.
While ongoing efforts to reduce the number of Class A mishaps in Naval Aviation are to
be applauded, there is potential for further improvement, especially in the area of human
error. When examining mishaps involving human error there are numerous theoretical
approaches from which to choose (Goetsch, 1996). Some are founded in industrial
safety; others are viewed from a complex systems perspective, emphasizing human
factors and operator error. Some approaches use models drawn from the domain of
preventive medicine that employ epidemiological factors to analyze accidents, while
other models utilize a combination of these approaches (Schmidt, 1998).
B. ACCIDENT DATA AND MANAGEMENT
1. Investigation and Reporting
Diehl's (1991) three-stage model of accident investigation and prevention focuses
on human performance and systems safety considerations (see Figure 2). Diehl's stages
are Accident Generation, Accident Investigation Process, and Preventive Measures. The
purpose of the first stage, Accident Generation, is the identification of hazards. Hazards
are circumstances or conditions which have the potential to lead to an incident (near-
accident) or even an accident. The second stage. Accident Investigation Process,
includes the collection, analysis, and review of accident data and the focus of this review.
In aircraft accident investigations, procedure calls for a fact finding body to investigate
the accident to determine what happened, and subsequently what caused accidents.
Lastly, a final report is made, which details causes of accidents and makes
recommendations to prevent reoccurrence (Diehl, 1991).
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Figure 2: Accident Generation, Investigation, and Prevention Elements
(After Diehl, 1989)
The final stage. Prevention Measures, details the methods used to avoid future
accidents. There are four categories of accident-prevention measures: (1) eliminating
hazards and risks. (2) incorporating safety features (3) providing warning devices, and
(4) establishing procedural safeguards. In ascending order, these measures are more
effective, but are also more expensive and more difficult to attain (Diehl, 1991).
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2. Accident Prevention
In the early 1900s, accident investigations were based on the notion people
commit unsafe acts that lead to incidents (Heinrich, 1959). This blame-based practice
deterred systematic accident prevention until the 1950's, when systems engineering
emerged from of the U.S. military's large-scale weapons program. Applied to accident
prevention, systems engineering focuses on the strengths and limitations of components,
including the human element, as an integral part of the system (Heinrich, Petersen &
Roos, 1980). Presently, up to 90 percent of accidents can be attributable to human error
in a variety of government, military and industrial settings (Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos,
1980; Hale & Glendon, 1987; School of Aviation Safety, 2000), so analyzing the human
element can vastly improve the understanding of systems and why they fail.
Operational Risk Management (ORM), an outgrowth of systems engineering, is a
tool that the armed forces employed to decrease accidents. ORM focuses on the
identification of hazards during mission planning to effect control measures which reduce
the associated risk. It is especially effective in highlighting human factor hazards (DON,
1997). The U.S. Army's aviation branch achieved record low accident rates in 1995 and
1996, largely attributable to their employment of ORM (DOA, 2000). Since 1997, the
other military services institutionalized ORM into their operational doctrine (School of
Avaition Safety, 2000).
3. Data Management
To be useful in the prevention of accidents, relevant data must be collected and
properly archived for future reference. Coding the data and the use of data bases have
become universally accepted methods for this task. The National Safety Council
11
established a numerical code system relating to each cause factor (National Safety News,
1975). This method of coding simultaneously made referencing for specific cause factors
much simpler, and also provided more efficient analysis capability by focusing on
specific causes rather than accidents as a whole. Additionally, it is essential to also
include "near-miss" incident data, as their circumstances are as likely to cause an
accident in the future. Computer analysis tools can significantly aid reviews of mishap
histories (Grimaldi & Simonds, 1984). To be truly effective in reducing future accidents
and incidents those tools must organize and tabulate the data logically, and present it for
analysis in easily accessible, user friendly formats.
C. ACCIDENT CAUSATION THEORIES
There are numerous theoretical approaches to examine mishaps involving human
error (Goetsch, 1996). Three of the most recognized approaches are Heinrich's Domino
Theory, Edwards' SHEL Model and Reason's Swiss Cheese Model. Despite differences
in approach and originating source, these theories compliment each other and provide a
solid foundation for analyzing human error in avaition mishaps.
1. Heinrich's "Domino" Theory
Considered to be the original accident theory (Goetsch, 1996), it details a linear
five step sequence of related factors (chain of events) that lead to an actual mishap. Bird
(1980) also held this view. The two central principles of the Domino Theory are (Bird,
1980): (1) accidents are caused by the combined actions of the preceding factors, and (2)
removal of the middle factor (unsafe act or condition) will negate the actions of the
preceding factors and thus prevent accidents and injuries (see Figure 3).
12
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Figure 3: The Five-Step Domino Sequence (Bird, 1980)




Lack of Control: This is a management issue where the emphasis is placed
on the control exercised in a situation for an array of factors.
2. Basic Cause(s): This identifies the origin(s) of the causes and includes
aspects such as human factors, environmental factors, or job-related
factors.
3. Immediate Cause(s): This includes substandard practices and conditions
that are symptoms of the basic causes.
4. Incident: This typically involves contact with the hazard, and for example,
results in a fall or impact with moving objects.
5. Personal Injury and Property Damage: This includes lacerations, fractures,
death, and material damage.
Each step preempts the next, causing it to occur; much the same way as one
domino falling causes the next domino in sequence to fall as well. Removal of the
factors that comprise any of the first three "dominos" will effectively intervene to prevent
the accident.
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2. Edwards' "SHEL" Model
The "SHEL Model" (see Figure 4) of system design was developed in the early
1970's to provide a better way to evaluate failures in human-machine systems (Hawkins,
1992). It identifies and defines four system dimensions: Software, Hardware,
Environment, and Liveware. The "SHEL Model" provides a method to describe systems,
identify potential areas for concern within a system, and proposes a general framework
for accident investigation. Edwards (1988) defines SHEL concepts as follows:
Software: the rules, regulations, laws, orders, standard operating procedures, customs,
practices, and habits that govern the manner in which the system operates and in which
the information within it is organized. Software is typically a collection of documents.
1. Hardware: the buildings, vehicles, equipment, and materials of which the
system is comprised.
2. Environmental conditions: the physical, economic, political and social
factors within which the software, hardware, and liveware operate.
3. Liveware: the human beings involved with the system.
According to the "SHEL Model," the system will fail when a disconnect occurs in
any one of the four dimensions, or in the connections between them. People are rarely
the sole cause of accidents (Edwards, 1988), but rather, accidents are caused by the
interaction of several factors (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). This multi-factor theory










Figure 4: SHEL Model of System Design (Hawkins, 1993)
3. Reason's "Swiss Cheese" Model
Reason's "Swiss Cheese" Model employs a vertical association human factors
approach to a collection of factors that eventually lead to an accident. It differentiates
between two types of errors: 1) active failures, whose effects are felt immediately, and
2) latent conditions, whose effects may lie dormant until triggered later, usually by other
mitigating factors (Reason, 1990). Latent conditions "set the stage" for an accident while
active failures tend to be the catalyst for the accident to finally occur. The model can be
thought of as slices of Swiss cheese lined up, with each vertical slice representing a
defense layer (e.g. training, good management, teamwork, etc.) and each hole
representing an active failure or latent condition in that defense (see Figure 5). Should a
situation where holes line up come to pass, an accident will occur.
This is a dynamic model with each defensive layer coming in and out of
prominence according to situational characteristics (Reason, 1990). An event may occur
in one of three levels: (1) person-unsafe acts, (2) workplace-error provoking conditions,
and (3) organization-error establishing conditions. Organizational factors, in which
strategic decisions and associated processes (budgeting, forecasting, resource allocation)
are initiated, provide the starting point for an accident (Reason, 1997). These processes,
15
influenced by corporate culture, are distributed throughout the organization to individual
workplaces. Corporate processes, evidenced as inadequate staffing, time pressures,
equipment, training and working conditions, combine with the natural proclivity to
commit errors and/or violations, to result in unsafe acts. Few of these acts, however,
actually create holes in the defense layers en route to becoming an accident.
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Figure 5: Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (Naval Safety Center, 1996)
D. HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS & CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (HFACS)
Efforts to analyze aircrew error in Naval Aviation mishaps led to the development
of HFACS (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). It began as a restructuring and expansion of
the Swiss Cheese Model, but it also includes features of Heinrich's Domino Theory and
Edwards' SHEL Model. The HFACS taxonomy recognizes the set of conditions within
which system operators perform, accounts for interrelationships among conditions, and
provides an overall sense of order or implied hierarchy. It identifies both active failures
and latent conditions within four categories (DON, 2000): (1) unsafe acts; (2) pre-
16
conditions for unsafe acts; (3) unsafe supervision, and (4) organizational influences. This
classification is then used to target the most appropriate intervention.
While Reason's "Swiss Cheese" model is widely held as integral to explaining
accidents, it does not provide a means of delineating precursors to accidents (Shappell &,
Weigmann 1997). Although modern analysis systems are heading in the right direction
regarding human factors investigation, more effort is needed. There exists a requirement
for a framework that allows for the explanation of accident causation involving human
error to include not only the causes of those errors, but also an explanation of those
causes. It is through such efforts that further occurrences of the same type of accident
can be avoided.
1. Maintenance Mishaps
The aviation industry has, in recent years, begun to apply human error theory to
maintenance-related mishaps with the intent of modernizing accident investigations
(Marx, 1998). Previously, it was believed that every error could be traced back to a basic
set of actions and associated conditions that precipitated the error (Goetsch, 1996). This
simplistic view did not allow for errors to have multiple causes, as most do.
Additionally, traditional investigation techniques, while appropriate for identifying the
causes of equipment failures, did not have the same success with human error-related
accidents (O'Connor & Bacchi, 1997). Typically, investigations would effectively end
when the cause pointed to human error, with no effort expended in attempting to explain
why the error occurred.
In a review of investigation and analysis systems for aircraft maintenance error,
the need for human factors investigation and reporting was identified (Marx, 1998).
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Although human factors investigation methods are acknowledged as critical to
understanding why people make certain mistakes, they have not been widely adopted.
The proper investigation of human factors, however, is vital to accident prevention
(Harle, 1994). The lack of thorough human factors investigation was caused by the
tendency to place blame, inability to see through proximate causes to underlying causes,
and an over-emphasis on static factors such as who, what and when (Marx, 1998).
2. HFACS-ME Maintenance Extension
In light of the above requirements, the HFACS taxonomy was adapted, and
augmented to classify factors that lead to maintenance mishaps (Schmidt, 1996). The
Maintenance Extension (ME) of the original HFACS taxonomy focuses on causation
factors particular to the maintenance environment. These aspects and their relevant sub-
section classifications are given in a manner similar to Reason's model. In the HFACS-
ME model, a maintainer's performance is seen as being influenced by a series of latent
conditions (supervisory, maintainer and working conditions) that can lead to an Unsafe
Maintainer Act, which in turn can lead to a mishap, injury or an unsafe maintenance
condition (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: HFACS Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME)
(DON, 2000)
HFACS-ME consists of four broad human error categories, three latent:
Management Conditions (e.g. inadequate supervision), Maintainer Conditions (e.g.
preparation/training), Working Conditions (e.g. lighting/light), and the fourth Maintainer
Acts (e.g. skill error), is active (DON, 2000). The three orders of maintenance error
(first, second, and third) reflect a decomposition of the error types from a macro to a
micro perspective. Each successive order provides for greater granularity, serving the
respective purposes of identifying problem areas, prioritizing potential targets, and
tailoring intervention strategies (see Table 1).
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Table 1: HFACS Maintenance Extension Categories (DON, 2000)

















































3. Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS)
The HFACS-ME taxonomy was used as the framework for the development of a
laptop prototype database tool, MEIMS. It is intended for fleet users to collect, catalog,
collate and analyze mishap data, and to better identify trends and for safety training. In
limited usability testing, MEIMS was proven to be effective, yet was lacking in some
areas. Specifically MEIMS was somewhat difficult to navigate, was lacking in assistance
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functionality and it's customer interface needed to be more user-friendly. The benefit of
user training was also indicated. To fully reach its potential, however, MEIMS needs
design refinements and more rigorous usability testing (Wood, 2000).
E. USER INTERFACE
The proliferation of computer systems into ever increasing environments
highlights the need for effective and easy to use interfaces. Clearly, the user interface is
the most important factor in determining the success or failure of a software application
(Liu, 1997). The design objectives of user interface include effectiveness, efficiency,
comfort and safety. The content of an interface should abstract critical features of the
target system (Norman, 1983; Vicente & Rasmussen, 1992), be consistent with human
conceptual and cognitive characteristics (Carroll, Mack & Kellog, 1988; Wickens, 1992),
be compatible with human response tendencies (Myers, 1991; Shneiderman, 1983), and
should help users effectively achieve their intended impact on the target system
(Sheridan, 1984; Shneiderman, 1992).
Williges, Williges & Elkerton (1987) examined design objectives from user's
perspective and generated a list of seven general design principles as a basis for
developing specific design objectives. The principles are (1) consistency, (2)
compatibility, (3) memory, (4) structure, (5) feedback, (6) workload, and (7)
individualization. According to these principles, a well designed user interface should
maintain the same style of interaction within itself and similar applications (consistency),
provide easily understandable interface symbols and icons to minimize the demand for
information recoding (compatibility), minimize the demand on the user's short-term
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memory (memory), help users understand the structure of the system (structure), provide
feedback and error-correction mechanisms (workload), and accommodate individual
differences (individualization).
From an engineering point of view, Shneiderman (1992) detailed four essential
classes of goals for interface design. They are (1) functionality to accomplish all
assigned tasks, (2) foolproof reliability, availability, security and data integrity, (3)
standardized styles and interface features to ensure portability over multiple applications,
and (4) development should maintain schedule and remain within budget. The goal of
interface design not only includes assisting the user in accomplishing their task of
controlling or influencing a target system, it should also help the user understand the
system.
In most cases, the target system and the user interface are usually designed by
separate individuals, who are often from different groups or organizations. The design
activities may take place at different places and at different times, making effective
communications between the two groups especially challenging. The two design teams
may have different objectives, constraints and conceptual bases. Interface designers must
establish early contact with not only future users of the system, but also designers of the
system so that both the "user model" and the "design model" can be clearly identified and
correctly reconciled. Interface designers must recognize and overcome these competing
models to successfully bridge the gap between the user's mental model and the system
designer's conceptual model of the same target system (Norman, 1983).
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F. USABILITY TESTING
Although user testing with real users is the most fundamental usability method,
other usability methods can serve as good supplements to gather additional information
or gain usability insight at a lower cost. User testing, combined with heuristic evaluation
and other usability inspection methods, can provide better efficiency (Nielsen, 1997).
Heuristic evaluation consists of finding usability problems in a design by contrasting it
with a list of established usability principles. Though this method works very well and
produces fast evaluation results, there are always some issues that will be left
undiscovered until actual user testing (Nielsen, 1997). In all testing, issues of reliability
and validity need serious consideration. Reliability considers whether one would get the
same result if a test were repeated and validity considers whether the result actually
reflects the usability issues one wants to test.
1. Reliability
Huge individual differences between test users presents a reliability problem with
usability testing. It is not uncommon for the best user to be 10 times faster than the
slowest user, or the top 25 percent of the users to be twice as fast as the slowest 25
percent of the users (Egan, 1988). Due to this phenomenon, one cannot conclude much
from observing a user A using interface X performing a certain task 40 percent faster
than user B using interface Y. User B could very well just happen to be slower than user
A. If the test were repeated with users C and D, the result could easily be exactly
opposite. Often decisions must be made on the basis of fairly unreliable data, which
while suspect, is better than having no data at all. Standard statistical tests should be used
assess test results and thereby indicate the significance and reliability. Although a 0.05
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significance level is often used for research studies, for practical development purposes
an 0.20 significance level might be more attainable due to budget and time restraints
(Nielsen, 1997).
2. Validity
While reliability can be addressed with statistical tests, a high level of validity
requires full understanding of the test method, as well as common sense. Typical validity
problems include using the wrong users, giving them the wrong tasks, or not including
time restraints of social influences. Confounding effects may also lower the validity of a
usability test. An example would be testing the move from a character based user
interface to a graphical user interface for an application. If, while running this test, the
two competing systems were running on screens set to different pixel graphic displays,
the test results may give a comparison between the two size screens rather than the
intended character-based versus graphical user interfaces (Nielsen, 1997).
3. Test Users
The primary concern regarding test users is that they should be as representative
as possible of the intended users of the system. Sometimes the exact individuals who will
be using a system can be identified. Typically, this case is specific to a system being
developed for an organization or department within an organization. Another case is a
system targeted at a certain type of user, such as lawyers, secretaries or warehouse
managers. In this case the users can be more or less homogeneous, but it is desirable to
select users from as many different locations as possible. For software intended for the
general population, almost anyone can serve as a test user. Lastly, care must also be
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taken to ensure that both expert, novice, and mid skill level users are chosen (Neilsen,
1997).
4. Test Tasks
Test tasks should be as representative as possible of the uses to which the system
will eventually be fielded. They should also reasonably cover the most important parts of
the user interface, be small enough to be completed within the test time limits, yet not
become trivial. The first task should be extremely simple to guarantee the user an early
success experience to boost morale. Conversely, the last task should provide the user
with the feeling of accomplishment (Gaylin, 1986).
Usability tests typically have four stages (Nielsen, 1997):
1
.
Preparation: Ensure the test room is ready and that the computer system is
in the start state, and that all test materials and instructions are available.
2. Introduction: Welcome the test user and give a brief expalnation of the
purpose of the test, to include computer setup if necessary.
3. Running the test: During the test itself, the experimenter should normally
refrain from interacting with the user. The exception to this rule is the
case where the test users is clearly stuck and becoming quite unhappy with
the situation. Caution must be exercised not to help the user too early.
4. Debriefing: After the test, debrief the user and get any subjective input as
soon as possible. During the debrief, extract from the user their input
regarding the test itself. Also, as soon as possible, ensure that all results of
the test have been collected and properly labeled.
Consideration of the required tasks is critical to properly setting up the test. It is
important that the test user feel as if their input is significant, beneficial and appreciated.
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5. Performance Measurement
Measurement studies for the basis of much traditional research on human factors.
User performance is almost always measured by having a group of test users perform a
predefined set of test tasks while collecting time and error data (Nielsen, 1997). There is
the potential, however, to measure something that is poorly related to the property which
is attempting to be assessed. Goals are generally abstract, so care must be taken to break
them down into components with specific usability attributes, which are to be measured
by specific tasks. Some usability studies use qualitative methods rather than exact
measurements. The focus of the test could be to determine which aspects of the system
work well and which are troublesome, yet not have any exact measures to differentiate
the two. To mine all possible observations of qualitative data analysis requires extensive
engineering experience. Even inexperienced usability engineers, however, can usually
ascertain major qualitative findings, as they are more likely to be readily apparent
(Nielsen, 1997).
G. SUMMARY
Naval Aviation has made significant strides in reducing the mishap rate in the last
half century. These advances can be attributed to more standardized investigation and
reporting systems, the use of systems engineering and the application of human error
causation theory on mishap cause factors. Significant amounts of data are being
collected, cataloged and stored for future reference. Computer database systems make
the organization of this data relatively simple. For Naval Aviation to take the next step,
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however, a robust system for analyzing stored data for trend analysis and prevention is
needed.
In an effort to provide a more useful data analysis system, HFACS was
developed, then expanded to cover MRMs in HFACS-ME. Proven to be effective in
capturing the nature of, and relationships among, latent conditions and active failures.
The HFACS-ME taxonomy was developed into a laptop prototype database tool,
MEIMS. In a limited usability study, MEEVIS was discovered to have great potential. To
fully attain its potential, however, MEIMS must be proven to be a user friendly system
which fleet users will embrace. Further system development and more rigorous usability
testing is required. With proper advances, MEIMS can be especially beneficial in
reducing aviation maintenance related mishaps.
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A desktop investigating, reporting and analysis system focusing on maintenance
error in aviation mishaps can greatly advance efforts to enhance safety and reduce
mishaps. This information management system's database is populated with historical
records of aviation maintenance mishap information. Additionally, a cursory training
lesson and a hands-on experience tool are developed which assists the participants in the
use of the database. Next, the prototype version of the tool is distributed to two sample
groups; one getting the training lesson and an operator's manual and the others getting the
training session, an operator's manual, and a hands-on experience session.
Participants in both groups are then provided a prepared task list that required
them to navigate through the system. At the completion of the task list, all participants
have viewed all portions of the prototype system, and have had the opportunity to form
an opinion on its effectiveness. The two groups' performance is evaluated to determine
the usefulness of the hands-on experience session in completing the assigned tasks.
Additionally, all participants complete an exit survey composed of demographic
background questions, opinion items of the prototype system (including improvements),
opinion items on the value of the training lesson and the hands-on experience session.





Students attending the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA) serve as
participants in the study. Most of the participants have recently come from fleet
department head tours or embarked airwing staffs. These aviators are from all aircraft
communities and within the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. All have had some experience
with mishap information reports and the data contained therein. They are representative
of the type of people that will likely be the primary users of the tool. The participants
were split into two groups of ten. The groups were distributed evenly matching rank,
branch of service, type aircraft flown and years of aviation experience. One group
receives a training lesson on the tool along with the instruction manual and the other
group gets the training lesson, instruction manual and an additional in depth tutorial.
2. Apparatus
The participants are introduced to the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System-Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) taxonomy and to the Maintenance Error
Information Management System (MEIMS) prototype data base tool. Additionally, the
students have access to three computer labs at the School of Aviation Safety via login ID
and password to a group account. Each computer in the laboratories is a Pentium I,
Windows 2000 operating system, with 15-inch monitor of 800 x 600 resolution or better.
Each has a full functioning prototype of the tool loaded onto it. Prior to logging on, both
groups are given a cursory training lesson and instruction manual in the use of MEIMS.
Additionally, one group is provided with an additional in depth tutorial in HFACS-ME
taxonomy and MEIMS capabilities. After a participant gains access to the computer, the
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icon "MEIMS Tool" is found on the computer desktop. Once the icon is selected, the
prototype opens using Microsoft Access 2000.
3. Instrument
The participant completes a usability test consisting of eleven tasks. After
completion of the test, an exit survey is constructed for completion by the participants
consisting of three parts: (1) demographics of the participant, (2) Likert-type questions
assessing feelings towards the prototype tool (including improvements), the hands-on
experience session and tutorial (as applicable), and (3) open-ended items to elicit
subjective responses. Participants receiving the tutorial answer additional Likert-type
questions and open-ended questions regarding the tutorial. Survey questions are designed
to determine if the tool meets user investigation, reporting, and analysis requirements.
The survey also queries the participants getting the tutorial in its value. Additionally,
participant performance between the two groups is evaluated to determine the
effectiveness of the tutorial.
Collection of demographic information is accomplished through the participant
selecting from a list of descriptors (squadron, experience with computers, software
familiarity, and operating system knowledge). The Likert-type questions use a five point
rating scale with verbal anchors: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly
Disagree. Open-ended questions are included to gain inputs on the overall impression of
the training lesson, prototype tool, the hands-on experience session, the tutorial (as
applicable), and recommendations for improvement.
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4. Procedure
MEIMS was revised and updated to include data derived from an available
database; a sample group of users will measure its effectiveness. The participants are
split into two similar groups. One group is provided an in depth tutorial (See Appendix
B) prior to using MEIMS. The perceptions and performance of both groups are measured
to determine the value of the MEIMS and the tutorial.
All Participants are given an overview presentation of the study consisting of a
projected computer demonstration of the prototype tool and distribution of materials
necessary to carry out the user test. The overview consists of:
• Instructions for Accessing the Prototype Tool - information to log on and open the
prototype.
• MEIMS Evaluation (Appendix C)—a series of planned navigation routes within
the prototype whereby the participant would be able to view the entire system.
• MEIMS Exit Survey (Appendix C)~Participants complete an exit survey
composed of demographic background questions, impressions of MEIMS and the
tutorial (as applicable) and open-ended question requesting participant's opinions.
All participants perform the above actions: access the prototype tool, navigate the
system using the prototype task list, and provide feedback on the system by completing
the exit survey. Additionally, the group receiving the tutorial makes comments on its
effectiveness and usefulness. The performance of the tutorial group is compared with the
non-tutorial group to determine the benefits of the tutorial.
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C. DATA TABULATION
The data is transcribed from the survey onto a Microsoft Excel 2000 spreadsheet.
The Likert-type questions, based on a five-point scale, are coded into the software (1
through 5) corresponding to the respective anchors (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral,
Agree, and Strongly Agree). Specific categories (MELMS is: Logical, Easy to Navigate,
Very Interesting, Relevant and a Good Concept) are examined for significant differences
between the tutorial and non-tutorial groups. Open-ended questions are tabulated by
theme and number of responses.
D. DATA ANALYSIS
The data analysis tools of Microsoft Excel 2000 are used to generate descriptive
statistics including the mean, standard deviation, and range of the collected data. The
performance of the two groups is tabulated, measured and compared. Independent t-tests
are conducted on the data to determine significant differences between the tutorial and
non-tutorial groups. Participant responses to the open-ended questions are also explored
to assess the perceived value of the hands-on experience session, the MEIMS tool itself
and the tutorial.
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A usability test was administered to twenty students at the Naval Postgraduate
School. They were randomly split into two groups of ten each. Many of the participants
(n=17; 85%) were designated Naval Aviators or Naval Flight Officers and represented a
cross section of the aviation commands that make up the squadrons in the Navy and
Marine Corps. One group of ten received a formal tutorial prior to testing the MEEVIS
prototype, while the other did not. One of the non-aviators was in the tutorial group, two
were not. Both groups were directed to access MEEVIS and complete an eleven-item task
list. Following the tasks, individual participants were asked to complete an exit survey.
The survey consisted of demographic information, queries regarding their satisfaction
with MEEVIS and queries regarding their satisfaction with the tutorial, if applicable.
B. TEST TASKS
The tasks portion of the test was designed to not only introduce the participants to
MEEVIS and exercise some of its capabilities, but also to test the effectiveness of the
tutorial. The tasks required the participant to access all functional areas of MEEVIS. The
tasks started relatively simply but became more complex as the participant became more
familiar with MEEVIS. Test performance is summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: Test Task Performance













The first task was accessing the program; all participants (n=20; 100%) were able
to access MEEMS with no difficulty. The second task requested the participant's opinion
of the main menu. A number of participants from both the tutorial group (n=6; 60%) and
the non-tutorial group (n=4; 40%) noted that the tab order was not sequencing properly in
the main menu. The third task required the participant to query a type of aircraft and
determine how many mishaps exist in the database for that type aircraft. Secondly, the
participant had to identify and define the level 3 codes. All participants (n=20; 100%)
were able to correctly complete this task. The fourth task asked the participant which of
the seven categories was most useful and which was least useful. Aircraft model (n=17;
85%) was considered the most useful, while Location of Mishap and Aircraft Type (n=6;
30%) were each viewed as the least useful.
The fifth task asked the participants to select their own criteria for a multiple
query. Some participants (n=5; 25%) created queries that were too restrictive for the
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limited number of mishaps in the prototype database. Once they viewed the error
message that their query was too restrictive, they were able to reselect and complete the
query. Both the tutorial (n=8; 80%) group and non-tutorial (n=7; 70%) group thought
this feature was extremely useful. The sixth task required the participant to access the
HFACS-ME Summary query and determine how many mishaps were in the database.
All participants (n=20; 100%) correctly obtained this information. The participant then
had to determine how many level one Worker Condition mishaps were in the database
and how many level two Medical conditions were in the database. All of the tutorial
group (n=10; 100%) correctly answered this question, however not everyone in the non-
tutorial group (n=7; 70%) correctly answered it. The seventh task asked the participant to
determine the number of mishaps of another type aircraft. All participants (n=20; 100%)
correctly determined the number of mishaps.
The eighth task required the participant to determine the number of Detached
mishaps in the Mishap Distribution - Location Report. In the tutorial group, almost all
(N=9; 90%) correctly answered this question. In the non-tutorial group, over half (n=6;
60%) correctly answered it. The ninth task asked the participant to graph two type
aircraft on the X-Axis versus HFACS-Level One codes on the Y-Axis. All participants
(n=20; 100%) were able make the graph. Some participants in both the tutorial (n=4;
40%) and the non-tutorial (n=2; 20%) groups noted that the graph provided frequency of
mishaps, vice some normalized baseline, like percent of mishaps per type aircraft. The
tenth task was to input two mishaps into the database. All members of the both groups
(n=20; 100%) were able to successfully enter mishaps into the database. It was noted by
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many participants in both groups (n=16; 80%) that the database does not adequately error
check the information being input.
The eleventh task asked the participant to check the Chronological Listing of the
mishaps that had been input into MEIMS. Again, all the participants (n=20; 100%)
correctly completed this task. Overall the performance of the tutorial group was slightly
better than the non-tutorial group (See Figure 7). In the tutorial group almost all (n=9;
90%) had no errors, while in the non-tutorial group less than half (n=4, 40%) had no
errors.
Number of Errors
D Tutorial Group Non-Tutorial Group
Figure 7: Test Task Performance
The mean percentage of correct responses for the tutorial group was 99. 1 (SD =
2.84, RNG = 10), whereas the non-tutorial group mean was 93.7 (SD = 6.07, RNG = 19).
An independent t^ai test comparing mean tutorial and non-tutorial group performance
was conducted. It assumed equal n, no difference between group means, and
homogeneity of variance. The observed t^ai of 2.55 was significant at the p = 0.02 level
for a two tailed test (See table Al, Appendix A). Given the variance for the tutorial
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group was 8.1 and for the non-tutorial group was 36.9, a second t-test was run for
unequal variance to reduce the chance of Type I error. The results are presented in Table
3. The observed tunequaj of 2.55 was significant at the 0.02 level.










Part I of the exit survey requested demographic information from the participants.
It established computer experience levels to determine if computer or aviation experience
had an impact on that participant's ability to utilize, or their satisfaction with, the MEIMS
tool. Demographic information is summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4: Demographic Information
Number of Participants
Demographic Tutorial Non-Tutorial
SQDRN MX 9 7
2 + YRS Computer EXP 10 10
Microsoft Office 10 10
Lotus Smart Suite 1 1
Corel Office 1
Word Processing 10 10
Presentations 10 10
Graphic Software 10 10
E-Mail 10 10
Database 4 6
Windows (3.1-2000) 10 10
Windows NT 10 10
Macintosh 1
Linux 1
Question one determined that 9 of the tutorial group participants had been
members of aviation units that performed squadron level maintenance (n=9; 90%). The
other member of the tutorial group was from a non-aviation background (n=l; 10%). In
the non-tutorial group, 7 participants were members of aviation units that performed
squadron level maintenance (n=7, 70%), one was a member of a staff that did not
perform maintenance (n=l; 10%), and two were from non-aviation backgrounds (n=2;
20). Question two indicated that all participants had at least two years of experience
using a computer (n=20; 100%). Question three determined that all participants (n = 20;
100%) were users of Microsoft Office. Minimal numbers in either group had used either
Lotus Notes (n = 2; 20%) or Corel/Word Perfect (n = 1; 10%). Question four established
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a participant's familiarity with different software applications; all participants (n=20;
100%) were familiar with processing, spreadsheet, presentation, and e-mail. In the
tutorial group, four were familiar with database applications (n=4; 40%), while in the
non-tutorial group, that number was 6 (n=6; 60%). Question five determined that all
participants (n=20; 100%) were familiar with Windows 97/2000, Windows NT operating
systems, or both. The MEIMS tool was loaded on computers running the Windows NT
operating systems.
D. USER SATISFACTION WITH MEIMS TOOL
1. Impressions of MEIMS
Part II of the exit survey requested the participant's impressions of the MEIMS
tool and its value to Naval Aviation. Participants responded to five statements using
Likert type responses selecting from one of five responses: strongly agree, agree, neutral,
disagree, and strongly disagree. Values of five through one respectively were assigned to
the statements. Additionally, participants could make subjective comments on any of the
statements.
Statement one asked whether or not a participant found MEIMS to be presented in
a logical form. The histogram of the frequency distribution for statement one is
presented in Figure 8. The mean for the tutorial group was 4.4 (SD = 0.52; RNG = 2),
whereas the non-tutorial group mean was 4.1 (SD = 0.57; RNG = 3). All participants in
the tutorial group agreed that MEEVIS presented the information in a logical fashion
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Figure 8: MEIMS is in a Logical Form
Statement two asked about the ease of navigation of the prototype. The histogram
of the frequency distribution for statement two is presented in Figure 9. The mean for the
tutorial group was 4.0 (SD = 0.5; RNG = 3) ? whereas the non-tutorial group mean was
3.5 (SD = 0.97: RNG = 4). A majority of participants in both the tutorial group (n=9;
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Figure 9: MEEMS is Easy to Navigate
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Statement three asked if the participants felt MEIMS was "very interesting." The
histogram of the frequency distribution for statement three is presented in Figure 10. The
mean for the tutorial group was 4.2 (SD = 0.63; RNG = 3), whereas the non-tutorial
group mean was 3.7 (SD = 0.82; RNG = 4). Most participants in both the tutorial group
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Figure 10: MEIMS is Very Interesting
Statement four asked about the relevance of MEIMS to aviation maintenance
operations. The histogram of the frequency distribution for statement four is presented in
Figure 11. The mean for the tutorial group was 4.6 (SD = 0.52; RNG = 2), whereas the
non-tutorial group mean was 4.5 (SD = 0.53; RNG = 2). All participants agreed that
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Figure 11: MEIMS is Relevant to Maintenance Operations
Statement five asked whether prototype concept was a good one. The histogram
of the frequency distribution for statement five is presented in Figure 12. The mean for
the tutorial group was 4.6 (SD = 0.52; RNG = 2), whereas the non-tutorial group mean
was 4.5 (SD = 0.53, RNG = 2). Again, all participants agreed that the concept of MEIMS
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Figure 12: MEIMS Concept is Good
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Independent tequai tests comparing tutorial and non-tutorial responses to the Likert-
type questions were conducted. They assumed equal n, no difference between group
means, and homogeneity of variance (See Appendix A). For the Logical, Navigation,
Relevance and Concept categories, no significant difference was noted. For the
Interesting category, an observed tequai of 2.59 was significant at the p = 0.02 level for the
two tailed test (See table A4, Appendix A). Given the variance for the tutorial group was
0.28 and for the non-tutorial group was 0.68, a second t-test was run for unequal variance
to reduce the chance of Type I error. The results are presented in Table 5. The observed
tunequai of 2.59 was significant at the 0.02 level.











Part III of the exit survey contained three open-ended questions regarding the
participants overall satisfaction with MEIMS. All participants made constructive
criticism, although overall, the response was very positive. The comments indicated that
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MEIMS is currently a good tool that has the potential to be extremely valuable instrument
in the prevention of mishaps (See Table 6)
Question one asked the participant to list the most positive aspects of the
prototype. Overall, the response was positive. Twelve participants commented to the
effect that MEIMS would make an immediate, positive impact on safety in the fleet.
Question two asked for the most negative aspects of the prototype. Most
comments were problems or suggested improvement to the interface. Such items
included error checking capability for data input, enlarge text boxes so the data can be
completely read, line wrap the Contributing Factors text box so that the factors are not cut
off after one line, and improving the tab function in the main menu, improve the page to
page navigation. Numerous suggestions were made for "normalizing" the graphing
functions. Several participants suggested a "find" mode in reports to prevent paging
through them to find the data desired. Responses produced no discernable difference
between the tutorial and non-tutorial groups regarding their impression of MEIMS.
Familiarity and knowledge of HFACS-ME terminology, however, was a distinct
problem for several of the non-tutorial group. Seven participants made some comment
regarding HFACS-ME terminology. Most found it hard to understand. Conversely, none
of the tutorial group, to whom the HFACS-ME terminology was thoroughly explained,
had a negative comment regarding HFACS-ME terminology.
Question three requested suggestions for changes to MEIMS. Most participants
re-iterated their previously mentioned "negatives." One participant made the suggestion
that the database should cross-reference the MIR messages for each mishap. Seventeen
made suggestions regarding navigation, error checking and GUI interface. One
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participant mentioned making MEIMS available on the World Wide Web. There were no
noteworthy differences between the tutorial and non-tutorial groups in response to this
question.
Table 6: Responses to Open Ended Questions
Number of Responses
Theme Tutorial Non-tutorial
Positive Impact 5 7
Normalize Graphs 4 2
Find Mode in Reports 2 3
HFACS Terminology Difficult 7
Improve Error Checking For Data Entry 9 6
Improve Navigation 4 6
Link to MIR message 1
GUI Improvements 8 9
E. USER SATISFACTION WITH THE TUTORIAL
1. Impressions of the Tutorial
Part IV of the exit survey requested the participant's impressions of the tutorial.
Participants responded to five statements using Likert-type responses selecting from one
of five responses: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. Values
of five through one respectively were assigned to the statements. Additionally,
participants could make subjective comments on any of the statements (See Table 7)
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Table 7: Summary of Responses to Tutorial
Tutorial Strongly Agree ! Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
Beneficial 3 6 1
Made Eva! Easier 6 3 1
Interesting 5 ! 5
Relevant 8 ; 2
Good Concept 6 4
Statement one asked whether the tutorial was beneficial. The histogram of the
frequency distribution for statement one is presented in Figure 13. The mean for the
tutorial group was 4.2 (SD = 0.63; RNG = 3). All but one participant in the tutorial group
agreed that the tutorial was beneficial (n=9; 90%). The participant that was neutral












Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
Figure 13: Tutorial is Beneficial
Statement two asked if the tutorial made the usability test easier to complete. The
histogram of the frequency distribution for statement two is presented in Figure 14. The
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mean for the tutorial group was 4.54 (SD = 0.93; RNG = 4). Almost all of the
participants in the tutorial group (n=9; 90%) considered the tutorial to be beneficial. The




















Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
Figure 14: Tutorial Made Evaluation Easier
Statement three asked if the participants felt the tutorial was interesting. The
histogram of the frequency distribution for statement three is presented in Figure 15. The
mean for the tutorial group was 4.5 (SD = 0.53; RNG = 2). All participants in the tutorial














Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
Figure 15: Tutorial is Interesting
Statement four asked about the relevance of tutorial to MEIMS. The histogram of
the frequency distribution for statement four is presented in Figure 16. The mean for the
tutorial group was 4.8 (SD = 0.42; RNG = 2). All participants agreed that the tutorial





















Figure 16: Tutorial Relevant to MEIMS
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Statement five asked whether the concept of a tutorial was a good one. The
histogram of the frequency distribution for statement five is presented in Figure 17. .
The mean for the tutorial group was 4.6 (SD = 0.52; RNG = 2). Again, all participants












Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
Figure 17: Tutorial Concept is Good
2. Open-ended Questions
The last portion of the exit survey contained three open-ended questions regarding
the participants overall satisfaction with the tutorial. The participants were asked about
the positive and negative aspects of the tutorial. Lastly, the participants were encouraged
to suggest changes to the tutorial. The comments made were overall positive. Some
constructive criticism was made, aimed at making the tutorial better.
Question one asked the participant to list the most positive aspects of the tutorial.
Comments referred to the tutorial as "comprehensive," "focused on the user," and
"providing the necessary background" to take the test. One participant stated that the
tutorial was thorough without running too long.
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Question two asked for the most negative aspects of the tutorial. There were
fewer negative comments than positive ones. They included deleting the historical
references in the beginning of the tutorial, making the slides "less busy," and too much
redundancy of the HFACS-ME codes.
Question three requested suggestions for changes to the tutorial. There was only
one comment made regarding changes to the tutorial (n=l; 10%). It was suggested that
the tutorial should be self-study, providing the participant either the slides (with notes), or
on a desktop from which to view the tutorial.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Naval Aviation is in the unenviable position of increased demand for high levels
of operational readiness, equipment availability, and personnel training within a climate
of reduced budgets. The notion of doing more with less is an everyday reality. To meet
this demand, asset preservation is vitally important, as funding for replacements does not
appear likely in the near future. In this fiscally strained environment, the costs ofNaval
Aviation mishaps, in terms ofmission capability, operational readiness, and material
status, are too high. Reducing the number and rate ofmishaps occurrence is paramount
to the success ofNaval Aviation. Furthermore, reducing "avoidable" mishaps, those
involving human error, is an absolute must. Human error in aviation mishaps must be
identified, and appropriate intervention strategies developed, aimed at reducing the
causes of those errors. Conventional accident causation theories suggest that accidents
are the result of a complex combination of errors. Naval Aviation must target
intervention strategies in key areas to effectively combat human error.
Initial efforts were made solely in the area of aircrew error reduction, and a robust
classification taxonomy. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
was developed. It was soon realized that to meet the goals in mishap reduction, Naval
Aviation had to look beyond aircrew error and study maintenance human error. To that
end a Maintenance Extension, HFACS-ME was built. This expanded taxonomy proved
to be an acceptable method for classifying human factors in maintenance mishaps. Using
HFACS-ME to study mishap causes, a clear picture of the human factors contributing to
mishaps can be drawn.
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To fully utilize the HFACS-ME taxonomy, a prototype database tool,
Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS) was created. It enables
better access to the data, query, graphing and reporting functionality, and the ability to
add new information to the database. In an initial usability study, MEIMS was
determined to be a valuable tool in the effort to reduce human error in maintenance. A
MEIMS revision was completed, updating and improving it, and targeting many of the
issues detailed in the initial usability test. Additionally, a users tutorial was built to assist
the targeted user in the introduction to MEIMS. This study investigated the validity of
the MEIMS tool and the tutorial. MEIMS is developing into a robust tool not only for the
analysis ofmishap causal factors, but also an effective weapon in the development of
prevention programs tailored to human error in maintenance mishaps. Its positive impact
on the fleet will be immediate and far-reaching.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The participants of the study were overwhelmingly supportive ofMEIMS and the
tutorial. Results from the usability test and the Likert-type responses indicate that the
tutorial was beneficial and made the test easier. Participants in the tutorial group
performed better in the tasks portion than the non-tutorial group. Based upon the
independent t-tests conducted, there was a significant performance difference between
the two groups, with the tutorial group performing better. The response to the Likert-type
questions did not indicate a significant difference between the tutorial and non-tutorial
groups (as determined by independent t-test) regarding MEIMS being logical, easy to
navigate, relevant to maintenance operations and a good concept. Regarding MEIMS
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being interesting, an independent t-test indicated a significant difference between the
tutorial and non-tutorial groups, with the tutorial group rinding MEIMS more interesting.
This data indicates an increasing interest level with increased exposure and knowledge of
MEIMS. The tutorial group's support for MIEMS was more enthusiastic. Although both
groups strongly advocated MEIMS relevance to maintenance operations and endorsed it
as a good concept, the tutorial group was more positive in supporting it. The participants
of the tutorial provided excellent feedback and also solidly endorsed it as a
complimentary link with MEIMS.
All participants made valuable comments and suggestions. Numerous previously
unrecognized GUI deficiencies were identified. Additionally, data error checking,
graphing and reporting anomalies were detailed. Most beneficial, however, were the
suggestions to make MEIMS a better product for the fleet. Specifically linking date-
time-groups ofmishap investigation reports to MEIMS was an especially astute
suggestion. Also, suggesting MEIMS for the World Wide Web, a pre-planned
progression for future iterations, was certainly perceptive.
The potential ofMEIMS is expansive. MEIMS should be expanded to include
other services, allies and NATO mishap information to broaden the scope from which
data is drawn. Efforts are ongoing to make a variation ofMEIMS that would include
civilian and commercial aviation. That would enable military users an even larger pool
of information from which to draw data and will be helpful in providing insights and
parallels between military and civilian/commercial aviation safety. MEIMS should soon
be available on the World Wide Web. It will be an excellent tool for users, from Naval
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Aviation's highest executive levels down to squadron work centers, to derive information
and to provide the necessary tools to prevent maintenance related mishaps.
C RECOMMENDATIONS
For any software tool to be effective, it must be considered easy to use and
effective. That notion is especially critical in a tool which the fleet is expected to use. If
it is not easy to use and effective, it will remain on the shelf. To that end, the following
recommendations are made for the MEIMS tool:
• Include the tutorial as a part of MEIMS, upgrading as necessary
• Provide better navigation from MEIMS functions to the main menu
• Improve GUI anomalies including the tab function on the main menu,
improving text boxes so that all data can be read by the user
• Improve the query causal factors to add text wrap, so mishap information
will not be cut off.
• Provide better error-checking during data input
• Add a find mode in the reports function to enable the user to quickly
access the desired data without paging through the report.
• Normalize graph presentations to provide a "weighted" view of data
• Provide more sub-menus to expedite multi-layer functionality
• Increase the volume of the database to include more mishaps
• Provide a link to the date-time-group of the Mishap Investigation Report
• Make MEIMS and the tutorial available over the World Wide Web
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MEIMS is already a robust tool for analyzing and reporting data regarding
maintenance human error. Making the above improvements will make it an even better
tool. Once it is available on-line with the proper training, it should be a well-used tool in
the effort to preserve lives, material and readiness.
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APPENDIX A
T-TEST RESULTS FOR MEEMS EVALUATION AND PART II OF EXIT
SURVEY
L MEIMS TASK PERFORMANCE
The following is the complete t-test results from the MEMS evaluation assuming
equal n and variance.












2. LIKERT-TYPE QUESTION RESPONSE
The following are the complete t-test results from each of the Likert-type
questions from Part II of the Exit Survey. The t-tests assume equal n and variance.
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APPENDIX B







LCDR Mike -Cracker" McCracken
NTS ITM Curriculum
F-I4RIO
(Ensure that the students have copies of these presentation slides to use as a
reference during the presentation)
Welcome to the Maintnenancee Error Information Management System (MEIMS)
brief. This prototype tool is built upon the Navy's HFACS-ME (Human Factors
Accident Classification System- Maintenance Extension) taxonomy. This
presentation will detail the HFACS-ME model in detail, explain terminology and
provide details. Please pay close attention and ask questions as necessary. After
explaining the HFACS-ME taxonomy, the MEIMS tool, built upon that taxonomy,
will be briefed and demonstrated.
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Slide 2
Naval Aviation Flight Mishap Rate
FY50-99tgled Carrier Decks
Aviation Safety Center
Naval Aviation Maintenance Program






Naval aviation has become considerably safer over the last few decades, but there is
still a need for improvement.
This chart shows the significant reductions in Naval Aviation mishap rates (per 100,000
flight hours) since 1950.
Improvements in Naval Aviation safety have primarily focused on engineering and
administrative controls. They have included (but have not been limited to) design
improvements (angled carrier decks), the creation of the Naval Safety Center, improved
maintenance programs (NAMP), training (FRS, NATOPS), local safety programs, and
system safety designated aircraft.
The Mishap rate has actually been cut in half each decade since 1950, HOWEVER, there
are still many Class A mishaps each year (155 total Class A*s for FY 95-99) which result
in unacceptable loss of life, disabling injuries, and hundreds of millions of dollars in
damages. So. again, improvements are necessary.
FY 95-99 Total Navy/Marine Aviation Class A Mishaps
Flight Hours Flight Mishaps Rate
FY95 1,656,450 34 2.05
FY96 1,650,026 36 2.18
FY97 1 ,523,507 27 1.77
FY98 1,518,109 36 2.37
FY99 1,527,186 22 1.44
FY95-99 7,875,278 155 1.97
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Engineering & Administrative Controls
have Impacted Hardware Reliability, but....
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"^"^ 22 Class A FMs in 1999 ^p'
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Engineering and administrative controls have significantly impacted hardware reliability (the
aircraft/machinery are more reliable), but mishaps still occur. Why?
This chart shows that over the last three decades, the material factors that cause mishaps (e.g., machine
reliability) have steadily decreased. Human error has also decreased (with training, proper supervision,
etc.), but at a slower rate so that it has resulted in a higher percentage of the factors that cause mishaps. In
fact, the percentage of human errors in mishaps is now increasing.
In 1999. there were 22 Class A Flight Mishaps; 17 had human error involvement (77%).
Again, there were 155 Navy/Marine Class A's for FYs 95-99!
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Mishap Data Analysis Focus:


















initial emphasis on "Pilot Error;
butts reach goal of cutting human
factors mishaps in barf the focus
has aimed to: Maintenance
Determined Causal Factor
(NOTE: Mishaps are caused bv more than one factor, therefore, the chart percentages total more
than 100%)
To further reduce the mishap rate, we must identify and correct the causes of mishaps.
Human error is involved in the majority of the determined causal factors in this chart, with material failures
listed in 39% of the mishaps. Human error preventative measures have primarily been concentrated on
aircrew and supervisory issues (e.g., training. SOPs). However, to reach the Human Factors Quality




We have just reviewed some statistics on major mishaps; however, MAJOR ACCIDENTS ARE
ONLY THE TIP OF THE ICEBURG.
To make significant improvements in aviation maintenance error, we must thoroughly analyze the major
mishaps. Fortunately, major accidents (Class A mishaps) are relatively rare events. However, this low
mishap rate poses a new problem. There is simply not enough information available from Class A mishaps
to conduct an effective trend analysis.
Solution: For every Class A mishap, there are numerous Class B, Class C. and hazard reports which have
similar cause factors. We must, therefore, thoroughly investigate the "minor accidents" as well as the
"majors" to discover these causes.
Heinrich Ratio
The relatively few number of catastrophic accidents are the "tip of the iceberg". For every major mishap,
there are 1 less serious accidents, 30 incidents, and 600 hazardous acts. The circumstances (cause factors)
which raise the severity of the accident are identifiable in all levels of accidents through adequate
investigation.
Source:
Heinrich. H.W.. Petersen, D. & Roos. N. (1980). industrial Accident Prevention: A Safety Management




The Costs of Navy
Maintenance Error Mishaps
(cost per year in 1997 dollars)
Class A Mishaps $85.0 Million
Class B Mishaps $3.5 Million
Class C Mishaps $3.8 Million
The Costs of Naw Maintenance Error Mishaps.
The costs are calculated from the FY90-97 Maintenance Related Mishaps and adjusted to 1997
dollars.
NOTE: This only includes component replacement costs and man hours to restore the aircraft in operating
condition. It does not include personal injury, loss of life, property damages or liability.
Class A S85.0 million/year
Class B $3.5 million/year
Class C $3.8 million/year



















OK, so we must investigate all mishaps. Are there better or different methods of investigation? Has
anything been overlooked?
Occasionally, an accident is so unique and overwhelming that it sends shock waves throughout the
industry. These "watershed events" provide a change in focus and are major catalysts for change. One of
the more famous "watershed events" was the 1996 Nashville, Tennessee F-14 mishap. This mishap had no
material factors... it was a human error mishap.
Following this mishap, the Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC) empanelled a
Human Factors Quality Management Board (HFQMB) to identify human factors threats and develop
intervention methods to combat them.
The HFQMB determined that Human Factors was the key to reducing the mishap rate to 1.0 (the
desired 50% reduction per decade with current rates stagnate near 2.0)
The HFQMB adopted a three-prong approach to study human errors in mishaps:
Mishap data analysis to identify hazards and risks
Benchmarking (of other military services, NATO partners, private industry, etc.) to uncover
best practices and find process improvements
Developing a Command Safety Assessment
The QMB's initial efforts were primarily directed at aircrew errors, but the QMB later directed a
Human Factors in Maintenance and Material (HFAMM) Process Action Team (PAT) to address




HFACS was developed to identify factors that relate to aircrew error. The Maintenance Extension
(HFACS-ME) was added to analyze human error in maintenance related mishaps. So how does
HFACS identify the factors specifically related to aviation maintenance accidents?
The "Maintenance Extension" taxonomy for HFACS was developed to further classify causal factors that






But does it work? YES ! HFACS has been applied effectively to the analysis of previous Navy mishaps.
Additional causal factors were identified, and more importantly, the classification or coding of these factors
was incorporated into an already extensive database of accidents and incidents. Standardized coding allows
identification of trends throughout the various accidents and will enable analysts to offer further prevention
strategies.
Most important: This DOES NOT require a reinvestigation of the mishap . It can be accomplished,
with minimal training, by investigators or analysts simply coding the narratives and causal factors that
previously were reported.
Due to its success:
- HFACS has been adopted for inclusion into the Naval Aviation Safety Program ( OPNAV 3750.6R)
- It has influenced policy changes to the Navy's Maintenance Program (4790 series)
- And is being used to further the effectiveness of Naval Aviation's methods of accident investigation,









Error Categories ofHFACS Framework
First Order Second Order Third Order
Condition
Organizational • Inadequate Processes
Inadequite Resources
- Inadequate Documentation. • Inadequate Design
Supervisory - Inadequate Supervision
• Supervisory Misconduct
- Inappropriate Operations -Uncorrected Problem
Maintainrr
Conditions
Medical - Mental State -Pnrsical State - Limitation
Crew Coordinatim - Communication • Assertiveness - Adapiabi&yfiBexftility
Readiness - Traising/PreparatioB - Certi£cat»H/Q«»li£cat»n - InfrinjeiHeJsJ
Workin;
Conatztons
Environment - Ligatiag/LijMt - Weather/Exposure - Environmental Hazards
Equipment • PamagcdVTrttscrviced • Unavailable.-'Inappropriate - Dated-Uncertified
Workspace -Coj;Sids» - Oostraete<l - Inaccessible
Maintainer Acts Error • ArfcxtMn/Heawrj
- SkSITTeennique




The HFACS-ME taxonomy also includes three orders of error: first, second, and third that reflect a
macro to micro perspective.
The levels provide sufficient description to develop a searchable database and are useful for distinguishing
supervisory areas of action. For example, a First Order category could be briefed at the Executive level, a
Second Order at the Vice President/Senior Manager levels, and the Third Order can be corrected by Safety
Officers and front line supervisors.












This model provides a realistic example of the interaction between the Error Categories.
Supervisory Conditions, Maintainer Conditions, and Working Conditions may
INDEPENDENTLY or COLLECTIVELY affect the Maintainers Actions.
The Unsafe Maintainer Act which follows may either:
(1) Lead directly to a mishap or injury (Example: a maintainer runs a forklift into
the side of an aircraft and damages it), or
(2) Become a latent Maintenance Condition, which the aircrew would have to
deal with on take-off, in-flight, or on landing. (Example: an improperly rigged landing
gear that collapses on touchdown or an over-torqued hydraulic line that fails in flight and
causes a fire)
It is important to note that Supervisory Conditions related to design for maintainability,
prescribed maintenance procedures, and standard maintenance operations could be
inadequate and also lead directly to a Maintenance Condition.
Please note that this model utilizes only the First Order Error Categories (again,
shown in red). So how does the Second Order Error Categories affect this





Error Categories of HFACS Framework





- Hazardous Operations • Inadequate Design - in
Documentation
- Inadequate Resources - inadequate Processes










Maintainer Medical - Mental State
Conditions




Maintainer Acts Error - Attention
- Dated/Uncertified
The Second Order of Error Categories (shown in Blue) is simply a further breakdown, or description, of the
First Order Error Category (so additional relationship models are not necessary). If we look back a couple








...the incorporation of the Second Order Error Categories would look like this.
Supervisory Conditions are established at the Organizational levels (outside your command) or at your
Squadron level.
Working Conditions that affect one or more maintainers include the Environment. Equipment, and
Workspace limitations.
Maintainer Conditions directly impact an individual maintainer and may include Medical, Crew
Coordination, or Readiness factors.
Maintainer Acts can either be Errors or Violations.
(NOTE : Multiple Error Categories may be factors in mishaps. For example, both Organizational
and Squadron practices may combine to form Supervisory Conditions that lead to mishaps, or a
combination of Equipment and Workspace conditions may promote an unsafe Working Condition.)
Now, as you probably surmised, the Third Order Error Categories are simply a further breakdown




Error Categories of HFACS Framework





- Hazardous Operations - Inadequate Design - Inadequate Documentation
- Inadequate Resources - Inadequate Processes







- Lighting/Light - Weather/Exposure -Environmental
Hazards
- Damaged - Unavailable - Dated/Uncertified






- Mental State - Physical State i - Limitation
-Communication - Assertiveness
Adaptability/Flexibility
-Training/Preparation - Cert;Tlcat;on/Oua!;fication - Infringement
Maintainer Acts
Violation
- Attention - Memory - Knowledge/Rule
Based
-Skill Based . -Judgment/Decision-Making
Here again, are the Third Order Error Categories (now displayed in Green).
The most effective way to define and display the relationship of First, Second, and Third error























Failed to Provide Guidance
Poor Risk Management
Operational Doctrine Errors













Fail to Enforce Regulations
Failure to Provide Oversight
Failed to Track Performance
Under Supervisory Conditions, we have both Organizational and Squadron Second
Order Error Categories.
We will start with the Organizational Category.
(Facilitator note: Read each term and its example below and then mention some of
the additional examples listed in each box on the slide. Encourage discussion from
students)
Under the Organizational Second Order, we have the following Third Order Error
Categories :
Hazardous Operations An engine that falls off of a stand during a change out evolution
due to an unforeseen hazard of a high seas state
Inadequate Design The poor layout of system components that do not permit direct
observation of maintenance being performed
Inadequate Documentation A manual omits a step in a maintenance procedure, such
as leaving out an o-ring that causes a fuel leak
Inadequate Resources Insufficient funding, manpower, tools, parts and equipment to
perform maintenance effectively and safely
Inadequate Processes Limitations in teamwork, communication, and directives within
and between organizations
(NOTE: The descriptions given, and the examples shown on the slide, are just that
.
. . examples. The purpose of this presentation is to establish a knowledge and











Fail to Provide Guidance
Fail to Provide Oversight
Fail to Provide Training
Fail to Track Performance











Fail to Enforce Rules/SOPs
Use of Unsafe Equipment
Use of Untrained Personnel
And under the Squadron Second Order Supervisory Condition, we have these Third
Order Error Categories:
Inadequate Supervision A supervisor who does not ensure that maintenance personnel
are wearing required personal protective gear
Inappropriate Operations A supervisor who directs a maintainer to perform a task
without considering risks, such as driving a truck through a nanear
Uncorrected Problem A supervisor who neglects to correct maintainers who routinely
bend the rules when they perform a common task
Supervisory Misconduct A supervisor who willfully orders a maintainer to wash an











Let us now examine the Working Conditions First Order Error Category breakdown.
(Again advise students to follow along with their copy of the HFACS-ME Framework slide),




















Working Conditions have Second Order Error Categories of Environment,
Equipment, and Workspace factors.
The Environment Second Order can be further broken down into the following
Third Orders:
Lighting/Light A maintainer who is working at night on the flight line does not see a
tool he left behind
Weather/Exposure A maintainer who is securing an aircraft in a driving rain fails to
properly attach the chains
Environmental Hazards A maintainer who is working on a pitching deck falls from the
aircraft.

















Extended Bevond Service Life
Equipment Third Orders are:
Damaged A maintainer who is using a defective test set does not pre-check it before
troubleshooting
Unavailable A maintainer who starts working on landing gear without a jack because all
are being used
Dated/Uncertified A maintainer who uses an old manual because a CD-ROM reader is
not available.
















And finally, Workspace factors can be separated into these Third Order Error
Categories:
Confining A maintainer who is working in a hangar bay cannot properly position the
maintenance stand
Obstructed A maintainer who is spotting an aircraft with his view obscured by catapult
steam
Inaccessible A maintainer who is unable to perform a corrosion inspection that is
beyond his reach.












Maintainer Conditions, the conditions that uniquely affect individual maintainors, are separated into
























The Medical Third Orders are based on an individuals mental and physical abilities
(and limitations) to perform a task at a certain time.
They include:
Mental State A maintainer who has a marital problem and cannot focus on a
maintenance action
Physical State A maintainer who worked for 20 hours straight and suffers from fatigue
Limitation (Physical) A maintainer who is short cannot visually inspect an aircraft
before it is launched















Fail to Brief/Make Suggestions
Fail to Correct Discrepancies








Crew Coordination factors include problems in:
Communication A maintainer who leads a taxiing aircraft into another due to improper
hand signals.
Assertiveness A maintainer who performs a task, not in accordance with standard
procedures, because the maintainer was overly submissive to a superior.







Not Trained for Task




Not Certified in Task






And the last Maintainer Conditions category to discuss is Readiness- Its Third
Orders involve:
Training/Preparation A maintainer who is working on an aircraft skipped the requisite
OJT evolution
Certification/Qualification A maintainer who engages in a procedure that he or she has
not been qualified to perform
Infringement A maintainer who is intoxicated on the job.










The final category is Maintainer Acts, which include Errors (mistakes) and Violations (willful acts),
















\ Skill Based I
Delayed Response
Overuse of Controls
















Maintainer Errors are of the following Third Order types:
Attention A maintainer who misses a hand signal and backs a forklift into an aircraft
Memory A maintainer who is very familiar with a procedure may reverse steps in a
sequence
Knowledge/Rule Based A maintainer who inflates an aircraft tire to a pressure required
by a different aircraft
Skill Based A maintainer who roughly handles a delicate engine valve will cause undue
damage
Judgment/Decision-Making A maintainer who fails to make appropriate decisions due





Did Not Follow Brief
Bending of Regulations/SOPs
Use of Incorrect Equipment
Violated Training Rules







Single Event to Save Time
Violation to Expedite Mission






There are also several types of Maintainer Violations. Their Third Order category
is based upon frequency, intent, and supervisory involvement.
Routine A maintainer who engages in practices, condoned by management that bend
the rales
Infraction A maintainer who strays from accepted procedures to save time, bending a
rule
Flagrant A maintainer who willfully breaks standing rules disregarding the
consequences
Sabotage A maintainer who performs a criminal act to destroy equipment or endanger
the lives of others
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(FY 90-97) Human Error in
Maintenance Related Mishaps
> 470 Maintenance Related





HFACS, as previously stated, has been used effectively within the Navy. Without reopening an
investigation, HFACS was applied to existing Mishap Investigation Reports,






> Inadequate/poor supervision of
maintenance evolutions
>Miscommunication - supervisor
to subordinate, pass-down, or
shift turnover
>Not using, lack of, or outdated
publications
> Violations - not following policy,
procedures, checklists, etc.
This slide shows the general findings of the analysis. I'm sure we are all familiar with these latent
conditions. Let us now look at another study of 63 Class A mishaps between FYs 90-97. (go to next slide)
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First Order Aiial ysis of 63 Maintenance Related Mishaps
HFACS ANALYSIS OF Class a FYs 90-97 Maintenance Related Mishaps (MRMs).
During FYs 90-97 there was a total of 63 Class A Mishaps, of which 61 were Flight. were Flight Related, and 2 were
Aircraft Ground. Two Navy Maintenance Officers and two Navy Chiefs used the HFACS Maintenance Extension to
classify the human factors causes reported in these mishaps. They discovered the following profile of human errors:
Management Conditions - 67% of all Naval Aviation Class A MRMs reported Squadron Supervisory
Conditions, whereas 21% had Unforeseen Supervisory Conditions (not shown).
Maintainer Conditions - 21 % of all Naval Class A MRMs reported Medical, CRM. or Readiness Maintainer
Conditions. Sote: Maintainer Conditions were under reported, more are likely present and have an effect.
Working Conditions - 3% of all Naval Class A MRMs reported Environment, Equipment, or Workspace
Working Conditions. Note: Workspace Conditions were under reported, more are likely present and have an effect.
Maintainer Acts - 75% of all Naval Aviation Class A MRMs reported Maintainer Errors, whereas 40% had
Maintainer Violations.
Clearly, latent conditions in the form of Supervisory, Maintainer. and Workspace factors are present that can impact
maintainers in the performance of their jobs. However, many Maintainer and Workspace Conditions arc not reported
due to the reporting system in place, perceptions of accident causation, or culture/climate issues. Specifically,
inadequate supervision of maintenance evolutions, not ensuring personnel are trained and/or qualified, not enforcing
rules, and poor communication characterize the majority of latent Supervisory Conditions. Poor pass down,
coordination, and communication; non-use or lack of publications, policies, and procedures: and fatigue comprise most
latent Maintainer Conditions. Finally, most Maintainer Errors reflect a lack of training, experience, and skill, whereas
Maintainer Violations consist of routine non-compliance with standard procedures and practices, and infractions,
bending the rules in order to meet mission requirements and the flight schedule.
Conclusions
HFACS-ME was effective in capturing the nature of and relationships among latent conditions and
active failures present in Class A MRMs. The insights gained provide a solid perspective for the
development of potential intervention strategies. The major mishaps analyzed were primarily FMs, meaning
that many imposed in-flight Maintenance Conditions on aircrew. During FYs 90-97 there were almost 500
MRMs in Naval Aviation, many of which were of lesser severity and were either Flight Related or Aircraft
Ground Mishaps. Such mishaps involve primarily ground and ramp activities and can lead directly to a
mishap or injury. Consequently, the present profile and observed relationships only hold for the mishaps
considered and cannot be generalized to all MRMs. Further, it can be contended interventions developed for
major mishaps that primarily involving maintenance activities such as engine repair are likely not appropriate
for ones of lesser severity that involve other activities such as loading ordnance or towing aircraft.
Presently, an in-depth analysis of all MRMs is underway and it is planned to contrast major vs. minor





>HFACS-ME is effective in classifying
aviation maintenance causal factors
> HFACS-ME enables organizations to
develop successful accident intervention
strategies
>HFACS-ME should be applied to both
major and minor accidents to fully analyze
maintenance errors
Presentation Summary:
The HFACS-ME model, as you have just seen, has demonstrated effectiveness.
With HFACS-ME, a safety organization can:
- effectively classify (code) maintenance related accident causal factors
- develop specific intervention strategies to mitigate causal factors
NOTE: Because most major mishaps occur during flight operations, it is essential to also evaluate the
'"minor'" mishaps and incidents that occur on the ramp and in the hangar. Such mishaps involve activities
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Second Revision (Nov 2000)
Now that we have some understanding of the HFACS-ME, lets take a look a the
prototype database tool which uses that taxonomy. It is called MEIMS,
Maintenance Error Information Management System.
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Notice the five button functionality, plus exit Placing your pointer over any




Select Mishap Data By:
£j Aircraft Model
j Aircraft Type
_J Branch of Service
USN. USMC








criterion trom the left
_j HFACS-ME Summary
by ME Calgaryusing a
WuStipie Criteria Query
_J Return to Main Menu
The query menu.
The user may select one or many (using the Multiple Criteria button) choices
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This is the TACAIR selection. Notice that the selected criteria is in blue. There is a
brief description, contributing factors and the codes for Levels 1, 2 & 3. Definitions
for those codes can be found by clicking on the "Define HFACS Codes" button.
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This is the Multiple Criteria Selection screen. Again, the mishaps meeting the
selection criteria are viewed...
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...with the selection criteria in blue. Define HFACS Codes allows the user to view
the codes for each level...
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..traveling right to left in Levels 1, 2 & 3
100
Slide 39







Si?!5Ct two or Tore
criterion iron the let
! j Branch of Service
JSN JSMC












' ' e l~r?*;3 Query
I
_i Year of Mishap
J Return to Main Menu
e»_^|
And Selecting HFACS-ME Summary gets the user..
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...This presentation. Notice that the user can modify the choices directly from this
screen (F-14/CIass B selected). This summary page is good for pulling out data
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_) Exit
Returning to the Main Menu, we will now look at the Graphing Function
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< Back
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Graph it
Both the X and Y axis may be further defined to produce....
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Mishap Distribution - Service
Mishap Distribution - Location
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(by Aircraft: 1 S8S-1 9S9; Maintenance on/y)
Return to Main Menu
...a choice of multiple reports
108
Slide 47
All Maintenance Related Mi
Service <1 989
3 UMK
Unsafe Supervisory Conditions (USC)






























-iocr% Hazardous Unsafe Operation
iOCr% Inadeauate Documentation
0**> Inadeauate Oeaqn
































I Expert Graph Menu
j Report Menu
LJ Add New Data
I Investigation Tool
_| Exit
The Add New Data button produces...
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A form on which to enter mishap data. In this case, it seems that some of Santa's
helpers may have run into some trouble.











_j Add New Data
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_! Exit
The Investigation Tool is not yet fully functional, but will allow the user to "drill
down" into the specifics an individual mishap to better ascertain learning point.




This concludes the Tutorial. You now have a better understanding of the individual
error categories and their interrelationships in a mishap's chain of events.
Additionally, you have seen some of the functionality of the MEIMS tool. If there
are no questions, please follow the instructor's directions regarding the usability
test.
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APPENDIX C
MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (MEIMS)
EVALUATION
Background. Thank you for participating in a usability study (evaluation) of a
prototype tool for the Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS).
This tool was developed at NPS and has been modified based upon previous usability
studies. This study is being conducted by LCDR Mike McCracken, USN as part of a
thesis project for his Master of Science program in Information Technology
Management. MEIMS was developed to address and identify patterns of human error in
Naval Aviation maintenance-related aircraft mishaps. The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) taxonomy is the foundation
of MEIMS and is an effective method for classifying and analyzing the presence of
human error in maintenance operations leading to major mishaps, accidents of lesser
severity, incidents and maintenance related personal injury cases. A previous study
indicated that prior to using MEIMS a tutorial, explaining the taxonomy and some
features, would be beneficial. This study compares two groups of users, one which
receives the tutorial and one that does not. Feedback from user groups will be used to
further improve MELMS and the tutorial.
MEIMS captures maintenance error data, facilitates the identification of common
maintenance errors and associated trends, and supports understanding of how to identify
human errors in the future. The target audience for this information management system
tool includes safety personnel (data entry & retrieval by unit safety officers, other safety
& training personnel, maintenance officers, maintenance supervisors), mishap
investigators-for data retrieval (Aircraft Mishap Board members, squadron safety
officers), and analysts (from the Naval Safety Center, the command's safety officer or
one from its higher headquarters). This tool allows can directly lead to a decreased
mishap rate and overall increased mission readiness due to the training and analysis
opportunity it provides.
Usability Study. You will be given a packet of instructions to guide you through
MEIMS. You will be asked to make comments on the effectiveness and usability of the
prototype system during your testing phase. Additionally, you will be asked to complete
an "exit survey" after completion of your testing. Questions will include demographic
information, objective questions about MEEVIS usability, questions regarding the tutorial
and its effectiveness (if applicable), and subjective questions and comments for areas not
covered in the objective section. The study should take no more than 15-20 minutes.
Completion of Study. Upon completion of your testing and survey you will be




Instructions for Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS)
Tool Evaluation
Start-up
1 . Go to a computer lab with OFFICE 2000 loaded. Log on into the NPGS domain.
Open Microsoft ACCESS 2000, then using the zip disk provided, open the file Hfac2000.
Question 1: Did you have any problems accessing the program? Y/N (circle one)
If so, please describe:
Main Menu
2. You will now have the Main Menu displayed with the world famous Supersonic
Hornet photo in the background.
3. Note the six categories next to the command buttons on the bottom right portion of the
screen. The system has "focus" on "Query Menu". Note the information on this button in
the bottom left gray buffer above the Windows Start button. Place the mouse pointer
over the Query Menu box (don't click, if you do, select <Back> on subsequent page) and
note information that appears in the Text Box (both of these sources of information will
be available throughout MEIMS).
4. Select <Tab> and view the same information for the remaining four command buttons
(note, if you select <Exit> you will have to re-enter the system (see step 1 above).
Question 2: Is the terminology clear enough to understand what each of thefour
command buttons does? If not, what could be changed to make it clearer?
5. Select (click or tab to & enter) <Query Menu>
Query Menu
6. Note there are two sections on the Query Menu. The left half of the screen has seven
categories to help you define how you would like to view the mishap data. The right half
of the screen has four command buttons.
7. Select <Aircraft Model>
8. Another form appears: "Query by Aircraft Type". Select your type aircraft, then
select <View Selections "Summary of Mishap" Form appears. Note, your aircraft
selection has a blue background. Review the "Brief Description" of the mishap and the
"Contributing Factors." View
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Question 3: What aircraft did you select ?_
How many separate mishaps of that aircraft type are in the database?
_
View one of the mishaps.
What are the level 3 codes & what do they mean ?
How did youfind that info?_
When you are through viewing the data, select <Close Form>
Select another aircraft type, and view some of the mishaps (optional).
When complete select <Back> on Query by Aircraft Model Form
9. Select another category (your option) & view the data.
Question 4: Which (ifany) of the seven categories do youfind useful?
Which (ifany) of the seven categories do you notfind useful?
10. Select <Multiple Criteriax Create your own query using two or more criteria.
Question 5: What Criteria did you choose?
How many mishapsfor your selection were in the database?
Did you find thisfunction useful? Why or why not?
11. Return to Query Menu. Select <HFACS-ME Summaryx
Question 6: How many total mishaps are in the database?
How many mishaps have a level one category of Worker Conditions ?_
How many mishaps have a level two category ofMedical?
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Further define the system by your aircraft model (or select another type).
Question 7: What aircraft did you select?
How many separate mishaps of that type aircraft are in the database?




Select <Report Menu>. Review the six command buttons and their functions.
12. Select <Mishap Distribution - Locations Review the report data.Find your type
aircraft (or review another) in the report. <Close> the report & return to the Report
Menu.
Question 8: How many Detached mishaps are in the database?
13. Select <A11 Mishaps-Chronological Listingx Review data. <Close> the report when
complete & return to Report Menu. Return to Main Menu.
14. Select <Expert Graph Menu>. Follow directions. Create one graph with aircraft
model (yours and 1 or 2 others) on the X-Axis and HFACS-ME Level One (all four
codes) on the Y-Axis.
Question 9: What aircraft did you select?
Did you notice a difference in the level one codes between the aircraft (if so, what)?
Return to <Expert Graph Menu>. Try more graphs as desired. When complete, return to
Main Menu.
15. Select <Add New Data>. Enter two mishaps to the database:
Question 10: What are the Mishap Numbersfor the data you are entering?
Check to see if your entries were added to the database by Looking at the end of the
Chronological Listing on the Report Menu (look for your Mishap Numbers).
Question 11: Did you see your data in the Chronological Listing?
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16. Return to Main Menu & Select Investigation tool. This selection is not yet fully
functional. It will be used to "drill down" a specific mishap or types of mishap to
determine if like factors occur. It will provide enhanced analysis and training benefit.
You may choose multiple criteria, just as in query, to limit narrow your focus (optional).
17. Return to Main Menu & Exit the Program.
18. Please fill out the Exit Survey Questionnaire.
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APPENDIX D
MAINTENANCE ERROR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (MEIMS)
EXIT SURVEY
User's Impression of the Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEMS)
Prototype Tool
Purpose: This survey evaluates a user's overall satisfaction of the Maintenance Error
Information Management System (MELMS) prototype tool. It consists of four parts.
Parti: Demographic Information. Part I provides the user's aviation
background, computer experience, and availability of software and hardware systems
used in the Navy and Marine Corps.
Part II: User Satisfaction with the MEIMS Prototype Tool. Part II deals directly
with user feedback as they use the prototype tool.
Part III: User Overall Satisfaction with the MEIMS Prototype Tool. Part III
allows users to give general feedback about the prototype tool.
Part IV: (if applicable) User Satisfaction with the Tutorial. Part IV allows user
to provide feedback about the Tutorial
Part I. Demographic Information
Follow the instructions after each numbered question or statement.
1 . I am attached to a command that primarily performs maintenance (military and/or
civilian) at the:




Command does not perform aircraft maintenance
Other (describe if other)
2. How long have you been using a computer?
(Select one from the list and check the box)
Less than one month
One month to less than one year
a One year to less than two years
Two years or more
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3. What software do you normally use?
(Check all boxes that apply)
Microsoft Office (Word, PowerPoint, Excel, Access)
What version?
(Check all boxes that apply)
97
2000
not sure of version
a other (describe if other)
Lotus Smart Suite (Word Pro, Lotus 123...)
What version?
(Check all boxes that apply)
a 97
9.5
not sure of version
other (describe if other)
Corel Word Perfect Office (Word Perfect, Quattro Pro...)
What version?
(Check all boxes that apply)
Corel Office 7
a 2000
not sure of version
other (describe if other)
Other (describe if other)
4. What software application categories are you familiar with?
(Check all boxes that apply)
Word Processing (MS Word, Word Perfect, Word Pro...)
Spreadsheet (Excel, Lotus 123, Quattro Pro...)
Presentations (PowerPoint, Harvard Graphics...)
Graphic Software (Corel Draw, Adobe Photoshop...)
E-Mail (Outlook, Eudora, AOL...)
Database (Access, DBase...)
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What computer operating systems do you use?
(Check all boxes that apply)





Other (describe if other)
Part II. User Satisfaction with the Four Sections of the MEIMS Prototype Tool
Select the category that best matches your impression of each of the below categories
(and check the box).
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
I feel the information
on the MEIMS tool was
in a logical form
I found the MEIMS
tool easy to navigate
My tour of the MEIMS
tool was very interesting
The information presented on
the MEIMS tool is relevant to
maintenance operations
The concept of the MEIMS
tool is a good one.
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Part III. User Overall Satisfaction with the MEIMS Prototype Tool
Please make any comments on the MEIMS Prototype Tool not reflected in your
comments in sections 1 and 2.
The most positive aspects of the MEIMS prototype tool were:
The most negative aspects of the MEIMS prototype tool were:
I would make these changes (if any) to the MEIMS prototype tool:
If you received the Tutorial, please continue on to Part IV. If you did not receive
the Tutorial, you are complete. Thank you! Your participation is greatly
appreciated!
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Part IV. User Satisfaction with the Tutorial
Select the category that best matches your impression of each of the below categories
(and check the box).
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
I feel the information





The Tutorial was interesting
The information presented in
the Tutorial is relevant to
the MEIMS tool
The concept of a tutorial
is a good one.
Please make any additional comments on the Tutorial.
The most positive aspects of the Tutorial were:
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The most negative aspects of the Tutorial were:
I would make these changes (if any) to the Tutorial.
Thank you! Your participation is greatly appreciated!
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